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IN THE SUPREME .COU.RT
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HI-LINE TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth District Court for Wasatch ~c·ounty
Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, Judge
J. ROYAL ANDREASE·N
Attorney for Appellant
914 Kearns Building

Sa1t Lake City, Utah

J. ROYAL ANDREASEN
914 Kearns Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attomey for Plaintiff-Appellant
Millers' Mutual Insurance Assn.
L E. MIDGLEY
415 Boston Building

Salt Lake City. Utah
A ttomey for Defendant-Respondent
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Statement of Facts -----·--------------·······--·············-····-------------------------
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Statement of Points Argued
Point I - Appellant's Brief Completely Misrepresents the Basis of Plaintiff-Appellant's Claim.
Plaintiff's Claim is Based on Tort, not on
.. Agreement." ------------·········-···-···-·-··················--------·········---

1

Point II - Respondent's Brief Does not Accurately
Represent the Nature and Effect of the Correspondence Between Appellant and Hi-Line's Agents....

5

Point III - Respondent's References to the Spargur
Case are Incomplete and Misleading -------········--------·······
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Cases Cited
Spargur v. Dayton Power and Light Co., 7 Ohio
Ops. 2d 138, 152 N.E. 2d 918 (1958) ..................................

7

Statutes Cited
Section 25-5-6 U.C.A., 1953 ·····-········--·-··········-----------·-·········-·····--
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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT
of the
STATE OF U'TAH
~lfLLI~H~· ~lrTtJ1\L IN~Ul{...\NCE
.AS~( )C I ;\rCION,

J)lui11fiff and . Jppellant,

·Case No. 999·6

vs.

lli-Ll NE T B:\.NSPO·RT·, IN·C.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEDLANT'~ RE~PL Y

STA·TE~IEN·T

BRIEF

OF FACTS

The facts are set forth in Appellant's brief, with supporting citations in the record, and need not be repeated.
POINT ONE
APPELLANT'S BRIEF CO:\IPLE·TELY MIS R .E PRESE~TS THE BASIS OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CLAIM.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAil\I IS BASED O·N TORT, N0 T ON
UAGREEMENT."
1

The defendant and respondent's brief does not acc.•urately represent the theory upon \Yhich the plaintiff
and appellant predicates it~ clai.Jn against Hi-Line TransSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
port, Inc. Respondent erroneously argues that plaintiff's
claim is based on some "secret agreement."
Appellant's claim is based on the tort committed by
Hi-Line.
Respondent's liability originated May 17, 1960, in the
accident when Hi-Line recklessly drove onto the wrong
side of the road and collided headon with and demolished
the Buick. The subsequent actions of the insurance adjusters as agents for Hi-Line Transport, Inc. did not
create the liability, and did not affect that liability by
increasing it, by diminishing it; or by extinguishing it.
Only had the insurance agents proceeded to actually pay
the claim would that liability have been affected or extinguished.
Respondent's brief merely sets up a straw man where
it argues that there was no agreement that Hi-Line personally would pay the claim. Appellant does not claim
that there was an agreement that Hi-Line would personally pay. The liability of Hi-Line is predicated upon
the commission of a tort by Hi-Line, not upon an agreement by Hi-L,ine to pay. It is no answer to the plaint1ff's
claim to say that Central Casualty had no authority Ito
bind Hi-Line to personal liability as is argued by respondent's prief. The consent of a tortfeasor to_ assume
liability is not needed. The tortious conduct gives ·rise to
the liability, not any act of consent by the tortfeasor,
either personally or through its agent.
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RPHpondent's brief misconstrues the basis of plain . .
tiff's elaitn and sets up a straw man when it argues. as
though appellant's claim was created or originated by
the action~ of the insurance adjusters as agents for HiLine Transport, Inc. That is not the case. 'The actions of
the insurancP adjusters as agents for Hi-Line Transport,
Inr. are significant in this case only because the respondent st'Pks to enjoy the fruits of the actions of its insurnneP adjusters, which induced the subrogee to refrain
frotn joining in the Salt Lake ~County action. Hi-Line
Transport now claims that because Millers was induced
to retnain out of the Salt Lake ~c·ounty action, Hi-L~ne
n1ay no"~ escape from its liability to the plaintiff arising
out of Hi-Line Transport, Inc., tortious conduct. This
points up the inequity of the respondent's position.
The tort, the causation, and the damage are admitted.
But respondent claims the subrogee is estopped from
claiming cotnpensation. Respondent seeks equity, but is
un\\illing to do equity. Hi-Line claims it should be freed
of its liability to the subrogee by estoppel because the
subrogee relied upon the representation of Hi-Line's
agents that the subrogation claim would be considered
separately and upon its merits when the personal injury
claim was tried. At the same time Hi-Line thus seeks to
profit from the actions of the adjuster, it tries to repudiate any responsibility for the adjuster's actions. HiLine seeks equity but refuses to do equity.
It would be contrary to principles of fairness and
equity to extinguish the liability of the tortfeasor to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff in this case by allowing Hi-Line Transport, Inc.
at one and the same time to claim and enjoy the fruits
and advantages of the actions of its agents, Homer Bray
Service, Inc., and Central Casualty Company, and at the
same time shun and avoid any responsibility for the actions of those agents.
Respondent completely misconstrues the nature of
the plaintiff's claim by arguing that it is based upon
secret actions of Hi-Line's agents. Hi-Line cannot accurately or equitably claim ignorance of its agents' actions,
especially when it relies on those actions as the basis for
its own claim of estoppel. When Hi-Line committed the
tort it observed through its agents that it as a tortfeasor
had totally destroyed a new Buick. When demands for
payment by the subrogee were made, those demands were
referred by Hi-Line to Central Casualty ·C·ompany and
its network of adjusters for investigation, negotiation
and defense pursuant to the policy, and Hi-Line should
not disclaim knowledge ot its agents. Hi-Line Transport,
Inc. participated fully in the trial of the first case after
having been served with a complain which clearly placed
Hi.[.;ine Transport, Inc. on notice of the fact that a
sizeable subrogation claim existed and that it was not
included in the first action.
Hi-Line T'ransport, Inc., an admitted tortfeasor,
comes before the court \Yith unclean hands and asks to be
relieved of its liability and unjustly enriched or rewarded
because its authorized agents induced the subrogee to
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r~frain in

g-ood· faith fro1n entering the Salt Lake County

action.
POINT TWO
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES NO~T AJGCURATELY
REPRESENT THE NAT·URE AND E'FFECT OF THE· ·CO·RRESPONDEN·CE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND HI-LINE'S
AGENTS.

The ronduct and correspondence of Hi-Line's authoriz~d agents for the negotiation and adjustment of claims
(Reeord ~7 and 28):
a. Did consent to and acquiesce in the treatment of
the subrogation claim as a separate cause of action.
b. Did ''Taive Hi-Line's right, if any, to have the
entire loss handled in a single suit.
e. Did represent to Appellant and lead Appellant
to reasonably believe that the subrogation claim would be
handled ~eparately and on its merits after the disposition
of the personal injury claims.
d. Did induce Appellant in reasonable reliance on
the representations of Hi-Line agents, to refrain from
entering the Salt Lake County action.
The conduct and correspondence of Hi-Line's agentc
did not give rise to a contract or agreement which superceded or affected Hi-Line's tort liability.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The correspondence (Record 27 and 28) between
Homer Bray Service, Inc. and Appellant does not constitute an "agreement" or release of Hi-Line's tort liability.
a. It is merely a consent to the h·andling of the subrogation claim as a separate claim or cause of action, to
be considered on its merits after the personal injury action, and a waiver of Hi.,Line's right, if any, to have the
entire loss considered as one claim.
b. It contains no understanding as to the amount to
be paid, if any.

c. It contains no understanding as to whether the
liability is contingent, or conditional (or upon what
contingencies or conditions it might rest), or admitted,
or absolute.
d. It does not contain a requisite memorandum in
writing of the terms of an agreement to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds (Section. 25-5-6 U.C.A. 1953) governing
agreements one to be bound for the obligation of another.
e. It contains no express or implied release of tort
liability of Hi-Line.
f. It contains no suggestions that Hi-Line's tort
liability would be released by anything short of actual
payment and formal releases.
g. It contains no suggestion that -c·entral·Casualty
was substituting itself for Hi-Line as the party primarily
liable.
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It is (•lear that had Central Casualty proceeded to
111ake actual payment it \voul<J have insisted on a rel-ease
of the clain1 against Hi-Line, and treated the payment as
n sPttl(ltnPnt of Hi-Line's liability.
POINT THREE
RESPONDENT'S REFERENCE'S T'O THE SPARGUR
CASE ARE INOOMPLE:TE AND MISLEADING.

It is pointless to argue what the Ohio court held in
the ca~w of Spargur vs. Dayton Power and Light Company, 7 Ohio Ops. 2d 138, 152 N.E. 2d 918 (1958) because
the court can read firsthand what the Ohio court held.
It is intportant to point out, however, that Respondent's
briefs to the trial court and the Supreme Court of Utah
do. not fully disclose the pertinent parts of the holdings
of the Ohio court. Appellant believes the partial quotatjons helped to mislead the trial court into error of law.
Respondent's quotations from this Ohio case on which
Respondent heavily relies are incomplete and misleading
in this respect: The holding had two branches: one applying to the power company, and the second applying to
four other defendants.
1. The first holding was that although the insured
had brought a prior suit against the power company for
damage to the insured and recovered judgment against
the power company the subrogee could bring a second
suit fot recovery ·of the damages of the subrogee against
the pozrer company. The p.osition of Dayton Power &
Light Company is the same as the position of Hi-'Line
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Transport, In~. in this action in that the first actions
found that the negligence of Dayton Power & Light Company, and Hi-Line T·ransport, Inc. were the proximate
causes of the respective damages. This branch of the
holding is in point with the instant case.
2. The second branch of the holding is not in point.
The Ohio court held as to the second group of defendants
(builders and contractors) who had been found in the
first action to be free from negligence and hence not
responsible for the damages, that they were not to be
under necessity of defending the second suit.
·The Respondent's reference to the Spargur case is
misleading because (a) it is silent on the first branch of
the holding where the facts are analogous and the holding is adverse to R~spondent, and (b) it mentions only
the second branch of the holding where the facts are not
analogous and language refers to a dissimilar factual
situation.
Respectfully submitted,

J. ROYAL

ANDREASE~N

.Attorney for Millers' Mutual
Association

914 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

